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I
THE NEa FOR FORItIN OCEAN CONFERENCES

This paper is concerned primarily with conferences in ocean foreign trade, although comparisons will be made with the conferences in other fields of transportation. It should be understood at the outset that the important controversy in ocean
foreign trade is not whether conferences should be allowed to exist, but whether they
should be allowed to use the dual-rate system whereby shippers who contract to deal
exclusively with the steamship lines of the conference are, by the terms of the
contract, given a specified rate discount.
Conferences are composed of ocean common carriers serving the same trade areas
who join together to fix rates or otherwise control competition in the trade. They
have operated successfully since 1875,' and, subject to federal regulation," they are
specifically authorized by section fifteen of the Shipping Act of 1916 to operate in the
ocean commerce of the United States? The i916 Act stemmed from lengthy investigations which the Alexander Committee, 4 a subgroup of the Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives, conducted pursuant to resolutions of February 24, 19m, and June A8, 19m. The Alexander Committee fully
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DANIEL MARx, JR., INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS 46 (1953).
'The federal agencies which have, in succession, regulated the shipping industry pursuant to the
Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Star. 728, 46 U.S.C. 5§ 8oi et seq. (1952), have been the United States
Shipping Board, the United States Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce, the United

States Maritime Commission, and the Federal Maritime Board [all of which are referred to hereinafter
as the '.'shipping agency"].
Shipping Act of 1916, § 15, 39 Stat. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952), authorizes the shipping
agency to approve, and thereby exempt from the antitrust laws, conference agreements "fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special
privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destioying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allocating ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number
and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of

freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any maner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement."

'Probably the fundamental issue before the Committee was, as stated by its chairman, Congressman
Alexander, on the floor of the House: "Whether or not we should recognize the agreements existing between carriers by water or recommend that the Sherman antitrust law should be enforced against them and
these combinations be broken up." 53 CoNG. REc. 8077 (i916).
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probed the role of conferences in the field of ocean shipping and in its reporto concluded:6
It is the view of the Committee that open competition cannot be assured for any length
of time by ordering existing agreements terminated. The entire history of steamship
agreements shows that in ocean commerce there is no happy medium between war and
peace when several lines engage in the same trade. Most of the numerous agreements and
conference arrangements discussed in the foregoing report were the outcome of rate wars,
and represent a truce between the contending lines. To terminate existing agreements
would necessarily bring about one of two results; the lines would either engage in rate wars
which would mean the elimination of the weak and the survival of the strong, or, to avoid
a costly struggle, they would consolidate through common ownership. Neither result can
be prevented by legislation, and either would mean a monopoly fully as effective, and it is
believed more so, than can exist by virtue of an agreement. Moreover, steamship agreements and conferences are not confined to the lines engaging in the foreign trade of the
United States. They are as universally used in the foreign trade of other countries as in our
own. The merchants of these countries now enjoy the foregoing advantages of cooperative
arrangements, and to restore open and cutthroat competition among the lines serving
the United States would place American exporters at a disadvantage in many markets as
compared with their foreign competitors.
More recently, the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee similarly
found that the conference system is valuable to the foreign commerce of the United
States and important to the survival of an American merchant marine. The Committee stated .7
It must be clearly recognized that the conference system has assisted in the establishment of an American merchant marine where before it had little chance of survival.
Before 1914, we carried only 9.4 per cent of our foreign trade in our own ships. The rates
have been set high enough to allow the American operator to at least meet his out-of-pocket
costs of operation, and while the foreign operator has many advantages, not the least of
which is greater profits on his operation, the fact remains that from the standpoint of
national security and from the point of view of the American shipper, the conference
system has paid off in stability of rates and improved quality of service.
The economic forces which underlie the tendency toward rate wars in foreign
ocean shipping are no less present today than in 1916, when the Alexander Committee
and Congress decided to foster the conference system in an attempt to curb rate wars
and their destructive consequences. These forces may be summarized as follows:
i. There is complete freedom of entry into international shipping upon the high
seas.' Any vessel of any flag may, with exceptions here insignificant, call at any port.
The proceedings before the Committee were published in four volumes [referred to hereinafter as
the Alexander Report (AL.ax. REP.)], the last of which, containing a summary of the evidence and
arguments and the Committee's conclusions and recommendations for legislation, is House Comm. on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Steamship Agreements and Affiliations in the American Foreign and
Domestic Trade, H.R. Doc. No. 8o5, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (i914).
a4 ALx. REP. 416-17.
7Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Merchant Marine Study and Investigation, S.
REP. No. 2494, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1950).
8 See MARx, op. cit. supra note x, at 279-84.
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In desirable trades, this leads to overtonnaging and keen competition, with both
new ships built to meet peak demands and older ships transferred from depressed
trades. If the abundance of cargo is temporary, the fight for existence will be even

more intense when traffic declines, especially from new lines which have come into
the trade. In contrast, carriers in other fields of transportation are permitted to enter

a particular service only after authorization, based usually on considerations of "public convenience and necessity," has been granted by a regulatory body
2. Because historically the seas have been free and the conimerce on them international in nature, it is difficult or impossible for a single government to fix minimum

rates and thereby prevent rate wars.'

In domestic commerce, however, regulatory

bodies have this power. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
authority to fix minimum rates "to keep in competitive balance the various types of
carriers and to prevent ruinous rate wars between them."'
3. Characteristically, ocean liners involve capital and operating costs which are
fixed and high, and which will be substantially the -same whether the vessel sails
full or half-full. Once committed to a voyage, the vessel is uhder strong compulsion
any empty space at any rate which exceeds the cost of loading and
to attempt to fill
discharging. Where there is no effective restraint upon competition, there is likely
at every port to be a fierce and destructive struggle to attract cargo by reducing rates
to the level which will fill the vessel.'
4. Liner steamship services, also known as berth and common-carrier services, are
those which operate on regular schedules between regular ports of call. Since the
liner, with its tremendous capacity, must call at each port, it would often be in the
interest of a liner to cut its rates at a given port, rather than to abandon the port

completely to its competition or to sail empty. In contrast, a railroad can dispatch
to any particular point only the number of freight cars which are necessary.
5. There are great differences in the operating and capital costs of carriers of
oThe Transportation Act of 1920 made the initiation of new railroad service conditional upon a
finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the new service was required for the "public convenience and necessity." 41 STAT. 477, 49 U.S.C. § i(x8) (x952). Upon.enactment of regulatory authority over domestic motor and water transportation in 1935 and 194o, respectively, similar conditions
were imposed upon new services in those -fields of transportation. 49. Stat. 5-5 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 3o6 (1952); 54 Stat. 941 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 909 (1952).

The Civil Aeronautics Act of

1938 made the initiation of new domestic or foreign air service conditional upon a finding of the Civil
Aeronautics Board that the new service provided by citizens of the United States was required for the
"public convenience and necessity" or that the new ,service provided by noncitizens "will be in the
.
public interest." 52 Stat. 987, 49 U.S.C. § 481 (z952).
"oH.R. iosoo, 64 th Cong., ist Sess. (1915), proposed a direct. system -of governmental regulation of
foreign commerce whereby conferences would not be specifically recognized and an administrative board
would be established with power "to determine and prescribe just and reasonable rates or charges to be
demanded or collected for the transportation of passengers and property,' and to issue licenses to engage
in the foreign trade of the United States. See the teltimony outlining theobjections to such a system of
regulation, in Hearings Before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R.
zo5oo, A Bill to Establish a United States Shipping Board, 64 th Cong., 1st Sess. 516-21 (i9x5). The
Alexander Committee already had concluded that ocean foreign commerce is not susceptible to direct rate
control by any one government.

4 ALEx. RE.

309-11, 420-21.

"New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 346-(.947).
1" See MAax, op. cit. supra note I, at 21-22.
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different nationalities.13 In an overtonnaged trade, the carriers whose costs are
low can profitably attract cargo at rates which are nonremunerative to vessels of other
nations. American-flag ships are particularly vulnerable in such situations because
generally their operating and capital costs are considerably higher than those of the
1 4
other maritime nations
6. In many trades, there is a severe imbalance between outbound and inbound
traffic. The fleet necessary to carry the cargo moving in the preponderant direction 5 will tend to overtonnage the trade in the other direction.16 This will tend to
create rate instability in the overtonnaged direction.

Notwithstanding the existence of such unstabilizing forces in foreign ocean shipping, an effective conference operating under the provisions of the Shipping Act of
1916 can normally prevent the outbreak of rate wars in a trade by providing a forum
in which its membership can agree to establish and abide by a single tariff of rates.
When, however, a trade becomes overtonnaged and one or more strong independent
lines exist, the conference lines are likely to lose their ability thus to control rates
because an independent, by undercutting the conference rates by a fixed percentage,
7
can divert substantial quantities of traffic from conference vessels.1
By thus filling its vessels to a greater degree, such an independent reduces its
carrying cost per ton and is enabled to operate profitably, and ordinarily more profitably than the conference lines, despite its lower rates. If seriously hurt by the independent's rate-cutting, the conference lines are strongly impelled to abandon their
rate structure and declare the rates "open," which means that each member is permitted to fix its own rates. The result, obviously, is that all lines in the trade are
then in unrestrained competition, rate wars flourish, and low operating costs become
the main index of ability to survive. These are the conditions which were condemned by the Alexander Committee as being detrimental to shippers' 8 and carContract Rates-Japan/Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 7o6, 733 (1955).
"See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REVIEW OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT Tn,'Ps OF MARITIME SUBSIDIES 20
(1956).
"SInthe trades to and from the United States, the outbound traffic is generally heavier. A prime
example of overwhelmingly heavy outbound traffic is the U.S. Gulf/United Kingdom-Continent trade
(Trade Route 21), where, in 1956, 2,83o,ooo long tons of commercial dry cargo moved outbound compared to 710,000 long tons inbound. (Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Statistics and Special
Studies.)
loSee Contract Rates-Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, 4 F.M.B. 744, 748 (1955).
"'See MAEx, op. ct. supra note x, at 196.
"Shippers whose activities were studied by the Alexander Committee as well as those who have
testified before the FMB in numerous hearings have indicated a need for rate stability rather than the
low rates which prevail during rate wars. They testified that rate stability eliminates the undesirable
speculative risk which exists under open-rate conditions; that it reduces complaints from buyers abroad;
that it enables shippers and merchants to calculate laid-down costs and to arrange sales for delivery in the
future; and that it permits forward trading and the building of inventories. 4 ALEx. REP. 2974)8,
288, 299. See also Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Continuing in Effect Until
June 30, z96o, Dual-Rate Contract Agreements Approved Under Section 15, Shipping Act, 1916, S. REP.
No. 17o9, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958), where the Committee stated: "If, as alleged, Conference rates
are higher than need be, the benefits from the dual-rate system must be an overriding consideration, for
many of the largest exporters, industries and corporations have urged upon your Committee enactment of
this legislation to permit continuance of the dual-rate system. Opposition from industry to enactment is
negligible by comparison."
"
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riers'9 alike. The prevention of these conditions is the very reason the conference
system was legalized under the Shipping Act of 1916.
II
NATURE AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE DUAL-RATE SYSTEM

As we have seen, the Government-regulated conference system is needed and
recognized as legal in the foreign ocean commerce of the United States. We have
also seen that under certain conditions, conferences cannot prevent rate wars and
create stability simply by agreement on rates between themselves. Almost from
their inception, conferences have utilized one means or another to tie shippers to
the conference and thereby protect the conference rate structure from outside competition. 0 The principal shipper ties used in world trade, historically and today, are the
deferred-rebate system and the dual-rate system, or something akin to it.
The deferred-rebate system may be described as the return of a portion of freight
money contingent upon the shipper's exclusive use of conference carriers during a

specified period, coupled with a specified subsequent deferment period.' It has
been used by conferences since 1877, when it was inaugurated in the United Kingdom-Calcutta trade after the unsuccessful use of a form of contract-rate system. 2
The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, which investigated the British shipping
industry and filed its report in I9O9, five years before publication of the Alexander
Report, found that the deferred-rebate system was the most effective device for
insuring all the advantages of the conference system and refused to recommend that
it be made illegal?'3 The system, which is still widely used in trades between foreign
nations, was condemned by the Alexander Committee because its deferral feature
placed the shipper "under constant obligations to the conference lines,"2 and it was
specifically prohibited in section fourteen of the Shipping Act of 916.V On the
other hand, an exclusive-patronage-contract system similar to the dual-rate system
was described in the Alexander Report, but was not explicitly prohibited by the
Shipping Act.
"' The high capital costs characteristic of ocean shipping make it necessary for carriers to realize
revenues which will enable them to establish and maintain funds for the replacement of vessels. Obsolete
ships cannot be replaced, and improved equipment and techniques cannot be introduced if carriers waste
their assets in fighting rate wars. See 4 ALx. REP. 497; Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Continuing in Effect Until June 30, zp6o, Dual-Rate Contract Agreements Approved Under
Section z5, Shipping Act, 1z96, S. REP. No. 1709, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
"In addition to the use of shipper ties, conferences have attempted, at times, to control outside
competition by such crude devices as the "fighting ship," which is supported by the conference, to drive
a competitor out of a trade, and refusal of space to shippers who have patronized outside lines. Both
these devices were specifically outlawed by the Shipping Act of 1916, § z4, 39 Stat. 733, 46 U.S.C. § 812

(1952).

"' See also the description of the deferred-rebate system. Ibid.
"2See MARx, op. cit. supra note i, at 47.
" Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Report, Chm. No. 4668, at 50-52 (9o9).
244 ALEX. REP. 287. The Alexander Committee pointed out that: "In this connection it is argued
that the ordinary contract system does not place the shipper in the position of continual dependence that
results from the deferred rebate system. Id. at 307.
25 39 Stat. 733, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1952).
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Soon after passage of the 1916 Act, conferences began using the dual-rate system
in place of the prohibited deferred-rebate contracts, and the successive shipping
agencies charged with administering the Act were faced with questions of whether
they had authority to approve the dual-rate system and, if so, what criteria should
be used for approval. or. disapproval. The dual-rate system was attacked before the
shipping agencies and the courts as being illegal per se on two grounds.20 First, it
was contended that by its terms, the system violates section fourteen, Third, of the
Shipping Act of 1916. Under the system, signatory shippers pay one rate and nonsignatory shippers pay a higher rate for the same service. This has been held prima
facie discriminatory.27 In addition, the contract contains a liquidated damages provision which applies if a signatory shipper moves any of his shipments via a nonconference vessel. From this it is argued that the system is necessarily violative of
section fourteen, Third, which makes unlawful any "retaliation" against shippers by
resort to discriminating or unfair methods because the shipper has patronized another
carrier, or for any other reason.28
Second, it was contended that the system is necessarily violative of the unjust
discrimination provisions of sections fifteen and seventeen of the Shipping Act of
9
1916.
Although these sections appear to outlaw only unjust discrimination, it is
argued that the judicial history of "unjust discrimination," as revealed by decisions
under section two of the Interstate Commerce Act of i887" and section ninety of the
English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845,1 makes unlawful as unjustly
discriminatory any difference in the rates charged to shippers for carrying identical
cargoes over the same line, for the same distance, and under the same circumstances
of carriage, and this applies equally to the charging of different rates for moving
identical goods on the same vessel between the same ports.
The Federal Maritime Board and its predecessors have generally rejected these
two arguments and held that dual-rate systems are not illegal per se.82 They have
found important support for their position in the fact that the Alexander Committee
described an exclusive-patronage-contract system similar to the dual-rate system,
but the Committee and Congress did not undertake to outlaw it, at least by name
or description, as was done with deferred rebates and other competitive devices
considered unacceptable. 3
2 For a full review of litigation before the courts and the shipping agencies concerning approval of
dual-rate
systems, see Contract Rates-Japan/Alantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 7o6 (x955).
1
2 See Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 303 (937).
"=Shipping Act of x916, § 14, Third, 39 Stat. 733, 46 U.S.C. § 8x2 (1952), is quoted in pertinent
part in note 51 infra.
29 39-Stat 733, 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 816 (952).
o 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).

"8

& 9 Vict. c. 20, § 90.
Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S.S. Co., i U.S.S.B. 41 (5922), the first dual-rate case
before the shipping agency, it was held that the dual-rate practice of a single line (not a conference)
violated §§ z6 and 17 of the Act. Thereafter, dual-rate systems were upheld, at least in every case
where they were found. to conform to the criteria and safeguards discussed in the text.
" The FMB was convinced that the dual-rate system was in use at the time of the Alexander Committee's investigation. Contract Rates-apan/Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 706, 729-30
'In

CONFERENCES AND THm DuAL-RATE SYSTEM

In their dual-rate decisions, the courts and the shipping agencies developed criteria, as well as safeguards to independent lines and the public, which had to be met
before a particular system would be approved. The basic considerations set forth
by the Supreme Court in 1937, and adhered to by the shipping agencies since then,
34
are as follows:
In determining whether the present discrimination was undue or unreasonable the
[agency] was called upon to ascertain whether its effect was to exclude other carriers
from the traffic, and if so, whether ...

it operated to secure stability of rates with conse-

quent stability of service, and, so far as either effect was found to ensue, to weigh the disadvantages of the former against the advantages of the latter.
Consequently, since 1937, approval of any system has depended upon a weighing of
whether it is necessary to prevent rate wars, to permit forward trading by shippers,
and to assure rate stability and regularity of service, as against whether, and to what
extent, it would exclude independent competition in the trade.3 5
In judging a dual-rate system, the shipping agency will not allow a greater limitation upon competition than is absolutely necessary to prevent instability of rates and
service. Thus, a dual-rate system instituted by a single line which seeks to exclude
from the traffic all competitors will not be approved.s Nor will one be approved
in the domestic trades, where the shipping agency has power to control minimum
and maximum rates. 7 And approval will be denied where the system is used to
forbid shippers to route traffic via a port not served by the conference lines38 The
system will not be approved unless conference membership is open to any carrier
in the trade 9 upon payment of no more than a reasonable membership admission
fee.40 The differential between the contract and noncontract rates may not be arbi(1955)- It argued to the courts that Congress was aware that dual-rate contracts existed prior to 1916,
did not prohibit them, and, therefore, implicitly allowed them. See, e.g., FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356
U.S. 481, 493 (1958). The Board's argument was grounded principally on the following description, included in the Alexander Committee's statement of what it had found in the industry:
"3-Contracts with shippers which may be classified as:
"(a) Joint contracts made by the conference as a whole. Such contracts are made for the account
of all the lines in the agreement, each carrying its proportion of the contract freight as tendered from
time to time. The contracting lines agree to furnish steamers at regular intervals and the shipper agrees
to confine all shipments to conference steamers, and to announce the quantity of cargo to be shipped
in ample time to allow for the proper supply of tonnage. The rates on such contracts are less than
those specified in the regular tariff, but the lines generally pursue a policy of giving the small shipper the
same contract rates as the large shippers, i.e., are willing at all times to contract with all shippers on the
same terms." 4 ALE-X. Rr. 29o.
" Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937).
0 See, e.g., Contract Rates-Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, 4 F.M.B. 744, 758-59 (1955).
"8 Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S.S. Co., i U.S.S.B. 41 (1922).
"Intercoastal Investigation, i U.S.S.B.B. 400 (935); Gulf-Intercoastal Contract Rates, x U.S.S.B.B.
524 (1936).
" Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 22o, 226 (1939).
s Phelps Bros. & Co. v. Cosulich Societa, i U.S.M.C. 634, 640-41 (r927).
"'Pacific Coast-European Conference, 3 U.S.M.C. 11, 14 (1948).
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trary l or so great as to prevent the use of nonconference lines.4 2 The system cannot
be used to prevent routing of traffic on independent lines by buyers who are not
signatories to dual-rate contracts and who have, in fact, retained the right under
their sales contracts to designate the carrier, even though the seller is a signatory to
a dual-rate contract. 48 Approval will not be given if the liquidated damage provision
is too severe.44 And it will be withheld with respect to so much of a proposed
dual-rate system as would have been applicable to commodities not carried by nonconference competitors. 45
It cannot be said, however, that all the currently existing dual-rate systems meet
these criteria and safeguards. For one thing, many of them have never been specifically approved by the shipping agencies because the agencies believed that their
approval of the basic or organic conference agreement authorizing the fixing of
lawful rates carried with it the cover of authority to change rates; and the agencies
considered the inauguration of a dual-rate system to be a rate change.46 Of course,
upon complaint or its own motion, the shipping agency could review any dual-rate
system and disapprove it if it failed to meet the prevailing standards.47
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the "cover of
authority" doctrine on the ground that section fifteen of the Shipping Act of 1916
required specific FMB approval as "a necessary condition precedent to initiation of
[a dual-rate] agreement. 48 Because of the tremendous administrative burden and
the cases then in litigation which cast doubt on its authority to approve dual-rate
systems, the Board did not, subsequent to this decision, embark upon an investigation
of all existing dual-rate systems.
It is also true that some of the existing dual-rate systems may not meet all of the
above-specified criteria and safeguards because of changed conditions in the trade.
There is no provision in the statute or in the FMB regulations for periodic review
of dual-rate systems; hence, a system which was approved as necessary to prevent
a rate war may no longer be necessary for that purpose.
The position that the dual-rate system is not illegal per se, but rather is approvable if found consonant with the mentioned criteria and safeguards, was first
overruled by the courts forty years after passage of the 1916 Act in Isbrandtsen Co.
v. United States.49 There, the court reviewed the FMB's approval of a dual-rate
"'lsbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 886 (S.D. N.Y. 195).
'"North Atlantic Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 355 (1954); Contract Rates-Japan/Atlantic and Gulf
Freight Conference, 4 FM.B. 706 (1955).
" Mitsui Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 5 F.M.B. 74 (956); Contract Rates-Japan/
Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 7o6 (1955); Secretary of Agriculture v. North Atlantic
Continental Freight Conference, 5 F.M.B. 20 (1956).
"Pacific Coast European Conference, 3 U.S.M.C. Ix,x9 (1948); cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Freight Conference, 3 F.M.B. 235, 246 (i955).
" Contract Rates-Japan/Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 706 (x955).
"'Contract Rates North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 98, 104-05 (1952); Section x5 Inquiry, x U.S.S.B. 121, 125 (1927).
"Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220 (x939).
" Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see also River Plate and Brazil
Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 227 F.2d 6o (2d Cir. 1955).
4 239 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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system in the Japan/Atlantic and Gulf inbound trade5" and held that the Board was.
without power to approve any dual-rate system, since the system by its terms constituted retaliation by a discriminatory method in violation of section fourteen, Third,

of the Act.P1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the court of
appealsY2 Although the Supreme Court rested its decision entirely upon section
fourteen, Third, it is not clear whether it held that this section prohibits all dual-rate
systems or only those which the FMB finds "are employed as predatory devices"
having the intent and effect of stifling nonconference competition. The following,
we believe, is its central holding in the case:
Congress was unwilling to tolerate methods involving ties between conferences and shippers
designed to stifle independent carrier competition. Thus Congress struck the balance by
allowing conference arrangements passing muster under §§ 15, 16, and 17 limiting competition among the conference members while flatly outlawing conference practices designed
to destroy the competition of independent carriers. Ties to shippers not designed to have
the effect of stifling outside competition are not made unlawful. Whether a particular
tie is designed to have the effect of stifling outside competition is a question for the Board
in the first instance to determine.
Since the Board found that the dual-rate contract of the Conference was "a necessary
competitive measure to offset the effect of nonconference competition" required "to meet
the competition of Isbrandtsen in order to obtain for its members a greater participation in
the cargo moving in this trade," it follows that the contract was a "resort to other discriminating or unfair methods" to stifle outside competition in violation of § 14 Third.
It is significant that in a footnote to the second quoted paragraph, the Court
undertook to support its rejection of the system in question by pointing out that "the
Board estimated that Isbrandtsen would lose approximately two-thirds of its 1952
volume." Further, in discussing the argument that a decision along the lines it
adopted would be inconsistent with the decisions in two previous Supreme Court
cases which were were dismissed not on the ground that the system was unlawful,
but because primary jurisdiction to determine the validity of a dual-rate system
rested with the shipping agency, the Court stated:"s
Since, as we hold, § 14 Third strikes down dual-rate systems only where they are employed as predatory devices, then precise findings by the Board as to a particular system's
intent and effect would become essential to a judicial determination of the system's validity
under the statute.
Thus, the Supreme Court left unanswered the question of whether the Court
would strike down a system which is purely defensive in design and has the purpose
50 See

Contract Rates-Japan/Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 706 (1955).
Shipping Act of xgs6, § 14, Third, 39 Stat. 733, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1952), provides in pertinent part"No common carrier by water shall"Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, space accommodations when
such are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair methods, because such shipper has patronized
any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other reason."
"'FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (x958).
"I1d.at 492-93. (Footnotes omitted.)
"I d. at 499.
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and effect only of maintaining for the conference lines all or a given portion of the
cargo they carried prior to the initiation of the system. The Court's emphasis on the
stifling 55 effect on independent competition which must be present if the particular
system is to be considered a violation of section fourteen, Third, portends that such
a system will not be found to violate the section. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Burton and Harlan, stated: "Of
course these exclusive patronage contracts and the dual-rate systems of which they
are an integral part are designed to meet nonconference competition. And there
should be no mistake but that today's decision outlaws such systems."""
A second important question left unanswered by the Supreme Court is whether
it would hold illegal the use of a contract-rate system similar to those recognized by
the Alexander Committee. The Supreme Court distinguished the contracts described
in the Alexander Report, on which the shipping agencies had heavily relied, from
the one before it. It pointed out that the former subjected the shipper only to
ordinary damages for a breach and were very much like ordinary requirement contracts in that they obligated conference members "to furnish steamers at regular intervals and at rates effective for a reasonably long period"; in the latter, however, there is
no guarantee of service and rates for a reasonably long period and the shipper who
commits a breach is obligated to pay liquidated damages of fifty per cent of the
amount of freight which would have been paid had the shipment been made on a
57
conference vessel.
It seems probable that the conferences would provide shipper agreements with the
features the Court ascribes to the contracts reported in the Alexander Report if this
would remove the legal encumbrance from the use of the dual-rate system. Dual
rates are vital only when a trade is overtonnaged, and in such a circumstance, it
should not burden the carriers to guarantee space and rates for reasonably long
periods. The contract now used by the North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference provides for a six-month rate guarantee and does not contain a liquidated
damages provision.58
As a direct result of the Supreme Court's Isbrandtsen decision, Congress enacted,
on August 12, 1958, Public Law 85-626, which amends section fourteen to provide
that nothing in the Shipping Act of 1916 "shall be construed or applied to forbid
or make unlawful any dual rate contract arrangement" in use by conference members
on May i9, 1958, the date of that decision, "unless and until such regulatory body
disapproves, cancels, *or modifies such arrangement in accordance with the standards
set forth in section 15 of this Act."5" The amendment expires by its terms on June
WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIAT, DaroNAruY 832 (1953) gives the following definitions of stifle:
To stop the breath of; to choke; to suffocate; also to cause the death of by such means. 2. To
extinguish; quench; as to stifle a fire. 3. To smother; to keep or choke back; as to stifle one's sobs-v.i.,
x. To die by reason of obstruction of breath, 2. To suffer difficulty in breathing, as by reason of air
charged with smoke."
7
co356 U.S. at 5oZ
.
Id. at 494-95Secretary of Agriculture v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, 5 F1.B. 20, 29 (x956).
"

"i.

c072 Star. 574, 46 U.S.C.A. §

812

(Supp. 7958)...
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30, i96o. Its stated purpose is "to provide a reasonable time for thorough [con-

gressional] study of the entire operation of steamship conferences and their practices,
the first in 44 years."60 It validates dual-rate arrangements existing at the time of the
decision unless cancelled or modified by the FMB, and it thus continues, on a
temporary basis, a system that has been used by both shippers and the shipping lines
over the years. 0 '
As it now stands, the law (a) precludes the FMB from allowing the inauguration

of a new dual-rate system which has the intent and effect of reducing the independent lines' participation in a trade to a level below that which existed before initiation
of the system; (b) leaves doubt as to whether the Board may approve a new system
not having such intent and effect; and (c) empowers the Board to disapprove any
existing agreement which does not meet the criteria and safeguards developed by the
Board in accordance with the standards of section fifteen. 2 The law also is unclear
as to whether the Board may approve new exclusive-patronage-contract systems
similar to those the Supreme Court found were reviewed by the Alexander Committee.6
III
CONFERENCES IN OTHER

FIELDS OF TRANSPORTATION

A. Foreign Air Transportation
International air transportation, like ocean foreign commerce, is largely regulated
by means of a conference system. However, as we shall see, the competitive forces
in the two fields are different, and, as a result, the conference practices are different.
International air travel rates and practices are initially fixed and agreed upon
through the medium of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a
private trade association whose member lines carry approximately ninety-five per cent
of the world's international air traffic.P4 Unlike maritime conferences, each of which
operates in a particular trade, IATA, through its three subconferences, sets coordinated rates on a world-wide scope.!
The Civil Aeronautics Board approved in 1945, under section 412 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938,6' the agreements that embody IATA's articles of incorpora00 House

Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Temporary Extension of Use of Dual Rates by

Steamship Conferences, H. RaP. No. 2055, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
" Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Continuing in Effect Until June 30, X960,
Dual-Rate Contract Agreements Approved Under Section rS, Shipping Act, 1916, S. REP. No. 1709,
85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (i958).
6.'The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has already remanded a case in which the
Board had approved a dual-rate system which went into use prior to the date of the Supreme Court's
lsbrandtsen decision, so that the Board could reconsider the case in the light of the "unless and until"
clause of P.L. 85-626. Benson v. United States, 263 F.2d 899 (D.D.C. 1959).
01See supra notes 33 and 57 and text to which cited.
.' HearingsBefore the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Monopoly
Problems in Regulated Industries, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, vol. I, at 375 (1956).
as Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, The Airlines Industry, H. REP. No.
1328, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. ,2o-2i (i958).
ea52 STAT. 1004, 49 U.S.C. § 492 (1952).
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tion, thereby exempting them from the antitrust laws0 Since then, it has periodically
approved IATA's world-wide international rate and fare-fixing agreements. Although the CAB does not have direct authority over the level of rates and fares in
international air travel, it may disapprove any IATA agreement which it finds does
not conform to the standards of section 42. Thus, through the medium of approval
of IATA agreements, the CAB exercises some control over the level of international
air rates which it would not otherwise be in a position to do0' The inability of the
CAB directly to regulate foreign air travel rates has caused it "reluctantly" to grant its
approval of IATA's rate-making machinery 9 It has repeatedly asked Congress for

direct rate control over American air carriers in foreign commerce.7 0
IATA is principally concerned with passenger traffic, which, by its nature, is not
susceptible to a system of shipper-tying contracts. Similarly, passenger conferences in
the maritime field cannot use shipper-tying contracts. Both IATA and maritime
passenger conferences, however, exercise control of the travel agents of their lines
and limit the extent to which conference-approved agents may deal with nonconference lines. 7' Thus, an indirect method of tying passenger traffic to conference
lines is used in both air and ocean passenger transportation.
In the field of air transportation, whether passenger or air freight, competition
from independent lines is not an important problem. 2 This is basically attributable
to the fact that, unlike the seas, which are traditionally free, there is no right of entry
into the air space over the various nations.73 Rate stability in the international air
carrier field, therefore, stems from a condition which does not exist in the maritime
field, and it cannot be said that the ability of international air lines to regulate themselves without the benefit of shipper-tying contracts is proof that the maritime freight
conferences should be able to do the same.
B. Domestic Land Transportation
The railroads and other domestic carriers have long been organized into associations to facilitate joint action on rates and other matters. These organizations were
encouraged by the ICC because they provided a method by which proposed actions
"SAgreements approved by the CAB under § 412 are exempted from the antitrust laws by Civil
Aeronautics
Act of 1938, § 414, 52 Stat. 1004, 49 U.S.C. § 494 (1952).
8

e Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 65, at 217.

The FMB,

which similarly does not have direct authority to regulate rates in foreign ocean commerce, has stated
that if the rates of any conference become unreasonably high, it will disapprove the basic conference

agreement as detrimental to the foreign commerce of the United States. See Weil v. Italian Line, x
U.S.S.B.B. 395 (1935).
8
,Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 65, at 217-18,
70
1d. at 225.
'See id. at 204 with respect to IATA-approved travel agents; and FMB Agreement No. 120-74, in
Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, p. z5, on file with the FMB, as an example of a maritime passenger conference travel-agent provision.
7' See Hearings, supra note 64, at io62-64, ro68.
73For a statement of the specific factors which tend to inhibit rate instability in international air

traffic, but which do not pertain to maritime traffic, see Kharasch, Conferences of Carriers by Sea: Freedom of Rate Fixing, 23 J. Am L. & CoM. 287, 288 (1956). See also JOnN G. CoopER, Tan Rsorr To
FLY 122-96 (1947).
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of the carriers jointly could be initiated and submitted to that agency for approval.74
Antitrust suits against these associations were brought to the attention of Congress, 5
which, as a result, amended the Interstate Commerce Act so as to add section 5a,"
often referred to as the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, empowering the ICC to approve such
joint organizations and exempt them from the antitrust laws if they meet specified
statutory conditions.
The conditions specified in section 5a are that:
i. No agreement shall be made between different classes of carriers-railroads,
pipelines, motor carriers, etc.-unless it is limited to joint or through rate matters.
2. Agreements covered by section five of the Interstate Commerce Act-pooling,
division, merger, etc.-shall not be subject to, or approvable under, section 5a.
3. Agreements dealing with rates and service shall not be approved unless they
provide that members not concurring in any determination shall have the right to act
independently of it.

4. Any agreement not prohibited under the above conditions may be approved if,
"by reason of the furtherance of the national transportation policy," the Commission
finds relief from the antitrust laws should be provided.
There is a striking resemblance between the standard for approval under section
fifteen of the Shipping Act of 1916 set forth in the Swayne & Hoyt case77 and the
following direction of the House Committee on Interstate Commerce to the ICC:7
Congress... directs the Commission to determine whether the advantages to the public
interest, through furtherance of the national transportation policy, are such as to outweigh
the disadvantages to the public interest intended to be guarded against by the antitrust
laws.
Thus, Congress directed the ICC to judge association rate agreements under a test
similar to the one the shipping agencies had been applying to dual-rate systems
since the date of the Swayne & Hoyt decision.
The right of a nonconcurring member to act independently of the association
action with which it disagrees creates no impetus toward excessive rate instability
mainly because carriers regulated by the ICC are under a duty to charge "just and
reasonable" rates79 and the Commission is authorized to establish maximum and mim"House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Amending the Interstate Commerce Act, With
Respect to Certain Agreements Between Carriers, H. REP. No. ixoo, 8oth Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (947).
"Since the law places upon the carriers the duty to initiate rates which meet the same standards that
are applied by the Commission in reaching its determinations as to their lawfulness, it is difficult to see
how the carriers can perform their duty in that regard without following a procedure similar to that
employed by the Commission." Id. at 9-zo. The joint associations provide a method by which such -a
procedure can be employed by the carriers.
'5 1d. at 3-4.
'62 Stat. 472 (X948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1952).
'"Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937).
"House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 74, at 14. For a complete expression of the standards of § 5a, as interpreted by the ICC, see Western Traffic Ass'n-Agreement, 276
I.C.C. 183 (1949).
"Interstate Commerce Act § 1(4), 24 Stat. 379 -(1887), 49 U.S.C- § 1(4), (1952).
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imum rates encompassing the zone of reasonableness8 ° Other distinctions pointing
up the marked tendency to rate instability in ocean foreign commerce and the lack of
it in regulated transportation have already been discussed."'
There has been a recent development of dual rates in the railroad industry which
is worthy of note here, despite the fact that a conference is not concerned. It is reported that the Soo Line Railroad proposes to introduce the so-called "guaranteed
rate" system, which is substantially the same as the dual-rate system, so that it can
divert steel products from competitive modes of transportation 8 2 A guaranteedrate system applicable to the intrastate movement of crushed stone between two
points in New York has been published, effective March 2, x959, by the Delaware,
Lackawanna, and Western Railroad Company!' Thus, even in the Governmentregulated railroad fields, at least some carriers think that a dual-rate system is necessary to meet the competition of other forms of regulated transportation.

IV
POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The conference and dual-rate systems are presently undergoing thorough study
by the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and by the Antimonopoly
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. Our conclusions as to the legislative possibilities described here are based on the facts regarding conferences and
dual-rate systems that have so far come to our attention at the time this article is
is being written. Different or additional facts may be revealed by the current inquiries which could, of course, affect the validity of our views.
A. Open Competition
Congress can achieve unrestrained competition in the ocean foreign commerce
of the United States by subjecting the carriers to the antitrust laws. The Alexander
Committee decided against this course for reasons which seem still to be appropriate"
It would be contrary to the desire of the great majority of shippers and carriersf s
It would, we believe, cause rate wars in times of overtonnaging, with the weaker
liness6 being either destroyed or taken over by the stronger ones. s7 The victors in
a rate war would ultimately have to learn to live together, probably through some
form of tacit agreement, in order to recover their rate war losses. The tendency
S°Interstate Commerce Act § 15(4), 24 Stat. 384 (x887), 49 U.S.C. § 15(4) (1952).
" See supra notes 8-x6 and text to which cited.
"Traffic World, Dec. 13, 1958, p. 27; id., Dec. 2o, 1958, p. 42.
" Freight Tariff 6or Filed by the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., No. 581o, N.Y.P.S.C.,
June 29, 1959.
85
1d. at 2go.
"44 ALLx. RE.- 416-17.
" These would tend to include at least some American lines. Although American lines arc eligible
for a subsidy to meet the difference between their capital and operating costs an'd those of foreign competitors,
the conditions attached to the subsidy are not conducive to short-run competitive warfare.
"7 According to the records of the Maritime Administration, Isbrandtsen Co., which cut rates and
then successfully opposed in the courts the inauguration of a dual-rate system in the Japan/Atlantic and
Gulf trade, has had a constant and drastic decline in carryings from Japan to North Atlantic ports in the
United States since the conference opened rates in March 1953.
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then would be for the remaining strong lines to concentrate on preventing new
entries into the trade. The latter would find it almost impossible to commence
service in the face of all-out rate competition. We, accordingly, do not think that
open competition is feasible or long maintainable in the steamship industry.
B. Direct Rate Regulation
Congress could eliminate rate wars by requiring rigid rate regulation. The shipping agency probably would have to undertake this by setting a zone of reasonableness limited by maximum and minimum rates for all commodities in all trades,
but it would be an almost impossible administrative task, for there are innumerable
commodities and trades, and in each trade, there are many different lines with varying costs of operation and rate bases. It is questionable whether the shipping agency
could obtain the true costs and capital expenditures of all foreign lines. Also, the
agency would have to take account of the constantly changing tramp charter rates
because these are largely controlling on liners as to many bulk commodities. A
further, and perhaps paramount, obstacle is the fact that rate regulation would violate
the traditional freedom of the seas and could lead to rate regulation and the setting of
different rate levels by the nations overseas with whom this country trades. Obviously, the carriers could not operate under such circumstances, either as a practical
matter or legally, unless the national differences were resolved.
C. Continuance of the Conference System
Congress can continue the conference system and either eliminate all tying agreements, authorize a standard dual-rate system in all trades, or allow the use of dual
rates contingent upon certain trade conditions and safeguards.
If dual rates are to be eliminated without resulting rate ins tability, some provision for control of the practices of independent lines must be enacted. The form
this should take is no easy problem. One suggestion is that it could be made an
unfair practice for an independent to cut rates below a level that would be compensatory to the independent if it were carrying cargo at the average rate of vessel
utilization in the trade. This qualification is necessary because, as we have seen, the
compensatory rate per ton is normally much lower for the vessel which fills its ships
by cutting rates than for the carrier which sails with substantial free space because
it has adhered to the conference rates. It would solve nothing to calculate the compensatory rate of the independent upon a basis which includes cargo obtained
through rate-cutting. Since the costs of only a single carrier would generally be
involved, it should not be too difficult to test the allegedly "fair compensatory rate"
of the independent. This, however, would take time, and litigation for the purpose
would necessarily lag behind the actual practices of the independent. The conference
might find it more practical to open rates rather than to await the outcome of the litigation. Under such circumstances, this legislative suggestion could lose some of its
value.
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It is at least arguable that dual rates should be expressly sanctioned by legislation.
Both dual rates and deferred rebates are permitted under British law."' The conference system provides many benefits which are attainable only by the use of a tying
device. In view of this, it has been contended that the most effective tying arrangement should be used, even if it eliminates independent competition8 o Such an
arrangement could, however, deprive our foreign commerce of the stimulus of independent competition. That would not be so if Congress enacted a provision which
would allow the dual-rate system only where needed to prevent rate instability and
conditioned upon appropriate safeguards for shippers and independent carriers.
Such a statute has much to recommend it. It could include the safeguards which
have been delineated in the shipping agency decisions. Among other things, this
would insure that the system will be adopted only where necessary for rate stability,
and not for other reasons, such as preventing independents from entering trades in
which they do not at the time operate. The legislation also could provide for
periodic review (perhaps every two years) of each system by the shipping agency
as a useful safeguard in discontinuing systems that are no longer needed and bringing
to light other changed conditions ° To prevent the deterioration of trades pending
the results of the proceedings upon applications to institute dual-rate systems, it
would be well to authorize the agency to approve, prior to hearing, systems which it
finds are prima facie necessary to prevent instability. A time limit for such prehearing approval might be written into the statute.
D. General Observation Regarding Possible Legislative Action
The shipping agencies have historically considered that they must authorize the
use of the dual-rate system under certain circumstances if our ocean foreign commerce is to be free of harmful instability and ruinous competition. The Supreme
Court has very recently found that the Shipping Act does not empower the FMB
to approve dual-rate systems, at least where their intent and effect is to stifle independent carriers in the trade. This decision, as was the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia holding dual rates illegal per se, was based
entirely on the intent of Congress in passing the x916 Act. Neither of these decisions
held that the Board should not have the power to approve the use of a dual-rate
system limited by proper safeguards, nor that it would be illegal for it to be given
such power.
It is to be hoped that the proposal to enact legislation will not be considered
an effort to overrule, by legislation, the decision of the Supreme Court. Actually,
the issue before the Court was not the same as that now before Congress. The
question before the Court was simply to interpret the meaning of a statute (sections
8

sRoyal Commission on Shipping Rings, supra note 23, at 50-52.

8 Cf. dissenting opinion in Contract Rates-Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, 4 F.M.B. 744,

763 (r955).
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the annual review of charters provided for in 6o Stat. 43 (1946), 50 U.S.C. App. S 173 8 (e)

CON-EDENCEs AND THE DUAL-RATE SYSTEM

fourteen and fifteen of the Shipping Act of 1916).

621

The question now before

Congress is the merit of the dual-rate system. Thus, if Congress decides that it is
now necessary to give the FMB power to approve dual-rate systems, this would in

no way conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court.
On the basis of its current investigations, Congress will be able to determine

fairly whether the regulatory pattern that has been in practice under the 1916 Act, and
which is fundamentally based on the conference system, is still useful. If the answer
is negative, a new regulatory pattern can be enacted. If, on the other hand, Congress
determines that the x916 Act employs a pattern of regulation which is still fundamentally the most practical method of regulating foreign shipping, it can modify the
system to eliminate the problem areas which have manifested themselves since 1916.
The most important problem area is, of course, the use of the dual-rate system.
The Board will undoubtedly welcome a new delineation of its powers and any
guidance Congress can provide.

